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SECURITIES LAW: THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN AN SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTION-SHOULD EQUITY CONTROL?-SEC v. Aaron,

605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No.
79-66).
INTRODUCTION

It has been nearly five decades since the havoc of the Depression
caused Congress to enact the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.1 In this time it has become clear that the federal
courts have yet to uniformly settle the question of what constitutes a
proper cause of action under the antifraud provisions of these Acts.' A
related problem is whether the elements in a proper cause of action
should differ in an action brought by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) as opposed to one for damages brought by a
3
private party.
The Supreme Court decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder' has
added to this general uncertainty. While the Hochfelder decision dealt
with a private action for damages under the antifraud provisions, the
reasoning employed by the Supreme Court may indicate that the
scienter standard set forth therein also applies to the SEC.' The net
1. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U:S. 180, 187 (1963);
Comment, Injunctive Relief in SEC Civil Actions: The Scope of Judicial Discretion, 10
COLUM. J. OF L. & SOC. PROB. 328, 329-35 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SEC Civil Actions].
2. See SEC v. Penn. Central Co., 450 F. Supp. 908, 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Note,
Scienter's Scope and Application in Rule lOb-5 Actions: An Analysis in Light of
Hochfelder, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925, 926-27 (1977).
The antifraud provisions referred to are, section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (1976), and SEC rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), promulgated under
section 10(b). See note 20 infra for texts of these provisions.
3. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC rule lob-5 suggest only an SEC right
of action. See note 20 infra. The private right of action has been inferred. See Kardon
v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
4. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court was confronted with
a scheme worked out by Leston Nay, President of the First Securities Co. of Chicago.
Between 1942 and 1966, Nay induced respondent Hochfelder and others to invest in
high yield accounts. In fact, Nay kept the investment funds and made no record of the
dealings. In 1968, Nay committed suicide and exposed the fraud in his suicide note. A
suit was brought against the accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst, under a theory of
negligent nonfeasance. The cause of action, based on section 10(b) and rule lOb-5,
alleged that Ernst & Ernst had aided and abetted Nay's violations by failing to conduct
proper audits. The Supreme Court held Ernst & Ernst not liable because the accounting firm had not acted with scienter, or the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.
5. The Hochfelder Court explicitly refused to deal with the proper elements of
an action brought by the SEC for injunctive relief. Id. at 194, n.12.
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effect of Hochfelder, if applied to the SEC, would be to make it more
difficult for the SEC to bring a successful action because of the greater
burden of proof associated with the scienter standard.' On the other
hand, a line of Supreme Court decisions, contemporaneous with
Hochfelder, may indicate that the nation's highest court is only seeking to limit private access to the securities laws.'
In light of Hochfelder and surrounding uncertainties, a panel of
the Second Circuit decided SEC v. Aaron.8 The Aaron court determined that Hochfelder, a private action for damages, did not apply when
9
the SEC brought suit for injunctive relief. Therefore, the SEC in
With respect to private actions, the Supreme Court conducted an extensive
statutory analysis of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The Court concluded that the
language and legislative histories of these provisions compelled the view that scienter
was a necessary element in the cause of action. Id. at 195-206.
While the Hochfelder decision clearly applies to private actions under section
10(b), several authorities believe that the decision should be extended to SEC enforcement actions. See SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 565 F.2d 8
(2d Cir. 1977). See also Berner & Franklin, Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule JOb-5 Injunctive Actions: A Reappraisal In Light of Hochfelder, 51
N.Y.L. REv. 769 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Scienter A Reappraisal].
The SEC in Hochfelder argued for a qualified negligence standard in private actions. Under the SEC scheme, negligence would be sufficient for liability if: reliance on
the "negligent" act had occurred; money damages were ascertainable; and the losses
were forseeable. The SEC also urged the Court to remand the case in order to consider
possible reckless acts by Ernst & Ernst. Brief by SEC as Amicus Curiaeat 8-9, Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
6. Hochfelder requires the plaintiff to show and prove that the defendant had
the intent to. deceive. This differs from the negligence standard found in SEC v.
Aaron, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No. 79-66),
which merely requires a showing that defendant acted unreasonably. See text
accompanying notes 85-86 infra.
7. Four decisions particularly act to cut off private access to the securities laws:
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (suit brought under the 1934
Securities Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976), requires a showing by
plaintiffs of irreparable harm); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975) (suit brought under rule lob-5 for damages requires plaintiffs to be actual purchasers or sellers of securities); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421
U.S. 412 (1975) (refusing to imply a right of action for customers of broker-dealers to
compel the Securities Investor Protection Corp. to exercise its authority under the
Security Investor Protection Act of 1970); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 47
U.S.L.W. 4733 (1979) (refusing to imply a private right of action under § 17(a) of the
1934 Act).
8. 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No. 79-66).
The influence of the Second Circuit in securities regulation should not be understated
because that circuit has been a leader among the federal courts in this area of the law.
Bucklo, Scienter and Rule lob-5, 67 Nw. L. REV. 562, 576 (1972).
9. The Aaron court noted that while its SEC decisions varied from Hochfelder
on the scienter issue, the circuit court's private action decisions were consistent with
Hochfelder. See Lanza v. Drexel, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc); Shemtoab v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Aaron was required to show only negligent conduct rather than
scienter as set forth in Hochfelder.'" Thus, the elements for a proper
cause of action under the same antifraud provisions will differ depending upon the identity of the party bringing suit. This apparent inconsistency must be justified if the securities laws are to be rationally applied.'I
FACTS
Peter E. Aaron was employed by E.L. Aaron & Co., a brokerdealer registered with the SEC. Although Aaron held no corporate title
or office and was not registered with the National Association of
Securities Dealers as a principal of Aaron & Co., his duties were varied
and of the highest order. Specifically, his duties included supervising
Aaron & Co. registered representatives and maintaining the firm's new
market files. In these roles Aaron knew about the fraudulent and
misleading statements being made by Aaron & Co. representatives
regarding the Lawn-A-Mat Chemical and Equipment Corp. (LAM).
Although Aaron was notified by counsel for LAM that such
statements were being made, and knew that the statements being made
were false, he did little to halt the activity.' 2 The SEC commenced an
action in federal district court seeking preliminary and final injunctive
relief against Aaron, pursuant to section 20(b) of the 1933 Act and section 21(d) of the 1934 Act. 3 The SEC alleged in the complaint that
10. 605 F.2d 612, 623 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No.
79-66).
11. The Hochfelder analysis of § 10(b) becomes especially compelling in regard to
SEC enforcement actions when it is considered that only the SEC had the authority to
bring suit in 1934. See note 3 supra. Therefore, the congressional intent found by the
Hochfelder Court, see note 27 infra, must have been directed solely at the SEC. The
importance of Hochfelder in Aaron and all SEC enforcement actions cannot be
overstated. Note, The ScienterRequirement in SEC Injunctive Enforcement of Section
10(b) After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 419, 425 (1977)
(hereinafter cited as Scienter After Hochfelder]; Note, Scienter and Injunctive Relief
Under Rule lob-5, 11 GA. L. REV. 879, 890 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Scienter Under
Rule lob-5].
It should be also noted that the SEC in Hochfelder argued that the identity of the
party bringing suit should not be relevant in a section 10(b) action. Brief by SEC as
Amicus Curiae at 16-17, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). After
Hochfelder was decided, the SEC expected greater emphasis by defense lawyers on the
scienter issue when the SEC brought suit for injunctive relief. SEC staff counsel were
directed to stress the differing policies and purposes underlying SEC actions and
private actions in order to maintain the lower standard of culpability in SEC enforcement actions. SEC, GENERAL COUNSEL'S MEMORANDUM REGARDING ERNST & ERNST
V. HOCHFELDER.

12. SEC v. Aaron, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,043 at 91,683 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No. 79-66).
13. The 1933 Securities Act § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976), provides in relevant part: "Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or
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Aaron had aided and abetted the fraudulent activities of Aaron & Co.
employees in violation of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, and rule lOb-5 promulgated under section 10(b). The
district court ruled that negligence alone may suffice as a standard for
liability in Commission enforcement proceedings." The court found,
however, that Peter Aaron had in fact acted with scienter and that
Aaron could be held liable under either a negligence or a scienter
theory for violation of the antifraud provisions." Therefore, the
district court found that the SEC was entitled to a permanent injunc6
tion enjoining Aaron from further violations.'
DECISION
At the appellate level, Aaron alleged that the lower court had erred
in not requiring scienter as a necessary element of proof in SEC enforcement actions." Aaron further alleged that the evidence before the
8
district court was inadequate to establish scienter.' The circuit court
held that the scienter requirement enunciated in Hochfelder was not
applicable to government enforcement actions brought under sections
9
10(b) and 21(d) of the 1934 Act.' However, the Aaron court accepted
the lower court's finding that Peter Aaron had acted with scienter. The
district court's finding that Aaron had aided and abetted violations of
'0
sections 17(a), 10(b), and SEC rule lOb-5 was, therefore, affirmed by
about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation
of the provisions of this subchapter ... [the Commission] may in its discretion ... in
any district court . . . [act] to enjoin such acts or practices ......
The 1934 Securities Exchange Act § 21(d) 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976), provides in
relevant part: "Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged
or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of
this chapter ... [the Commission] may in its discretion bring an action in the proper
district court ... to enjoin such acts or practices . .. ."
For background to these statutes, see L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1975-83
(2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss SECURITIES REGULATIONS 4108-23 (2d ed. Supp. 1969);
Scienter After Hochfelder, supra note 11, at 430-34; SEC Civil Actions, supra note 1,
at 338-43.
14. SEC v. Aaron, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,043 at 91,685 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No. 79-66).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 91,687.
17. Brief for Appellant at 39, SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No. 79-66). Aaron argued that Hochfelder had held
that scienter was a required element, regardless of the plaintiff's identity. Therefore,
Aaron urged the circuit court to remand the case in order to reevaluate the scienter
issue in SEC enforcement actions.
18. Id. at 43.
19. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 619 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258
(1979) (No. 79-66).
20. Id. at 614.
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the circuit court, as was the lower court's grant of a permanent injunction against Aaron pursuant to sections 20(b) and 21(d)."1
In the opinion, the Aaron court concluded that Peter Aaron's lack
of corporate title would not insulate him from the securities laws. 22
The court then proceeded to address the issue whether scienter is a requirement in an SEC enforcement action. The court distinguished
Hochfelder, a private action for damages, and recognized a split of
opinion among lower courts in regard to this issue.23 The Aaron court
reasoned that the purpose of SEC enforcement actions is to provide
maximum protection to the investing public at large, while private
damage actions are brought to obtain monetary relief only for
individual investors. This reasoning compelled the Aaron court to conclude that the SEC should be allowed to function with fewer impediments.2 ' Therefore, the negligence standard, which suggests a
21. The theory of aiding and abetting primary violations is beyond the scope of
this note. See Comment, Rule lOb-5 Liability after Hochfelder:Abandoning the Concept of Aiding and Abetting, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 218 (1977).
The 1933 Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), states in relevant part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . (1) to
employ any devise, scheme or artifice to defraud, or ... (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon the purchaser."
The 1934 Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), states in relevant part: "It shall be unlawful for any person ... (b) To use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe . .
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1979), promulgated by the SEC in 1942 pursuant
to section 10(b), provides in relevant part: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . (1)
to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud . . (3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates ... as a fraud or deceit ... in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security."
For a background to these statutes and rule, see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1683-1862 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 3820-4003 (2d ed.
Supp. 1969).
22. 605 F.2d 612, 619 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No.
79-66). See SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd
mem., 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977) (holding that a party
should be viewed by his duties and responsibilities rather than title).
23. Compare SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (post-Hochfelder SEC
enforcement actions requiring a scienter showing under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5)
and SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd on other
grounds, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977) with SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,751 (1st Cir. 1976) (scienter not required) and SEC v. Shiell, FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,190 (N.D. Fla. 1977) and SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715
(N.D. Cal. 1976).
Compare SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) and SEC v. Pearson,
426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970) and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc) (pre-Hochfelder SEC enforcement actions not requiring scienter
for a section 10(b) and rule lob-5 violation) with SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th
required).
showing
Cir. 1974)by(scienter
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lower burden of proof, should prevail over the Hochfelder scienter
standard when the SEC brings suit under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
The appellate court further noted that the Hochfelder statutory
analysis is not conclusive with respect to the issue.25 The language of
26
section 10(b) has been subjected to different judicial interpretations
and the legislative history of the section does not reveal a definite congressional intent." The Aaron court reasoned that because section
10(b) can not be conclusively interpreted, section 21(d), as the source
of SEC authority to seek injunctions, should be analyzed in detail. The
Aaron court's analysis of the language and history of section 21(d)
indicated that scienter was not an element in SEC actions for equitable
28
relief.
The appeals court additionally stated that because scienter was not
required when the SEC brought suit under section 10(b), it would not
be required for a section 17(a) action. Aaron cited SEC v. Coven, 29
which held that section 17(a) antifraud provision did not contain
language comparable to the section 10(b) terms "manipulative and
deceptive". Therefore, the Hochfelder statutory approach had no application to section 17(a).3 The Aaron court did note that Hochfelder
had not reached the scienter question under section 17(a), and the
federal courts have been split on the issue since that Supreme Court
decision. 3'
The Aaron court concluded that a permanent injunction was
24. 605 F.2d 612, 621 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258.(1979) (No.
79-66).
25. Id. at 621-25. See also Scienter After Hochfelder, supra note 11, at 425-28
(author critical of the Hochfelder statutory analysis of section 10(b)).
26. 605 F.2d 612, 621 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No.
79-66)).
27. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) (absent a clear legislative intent in regard to
section 10(b), policy is controlling); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967)
(language of section 10(b) indicates that scienter is not required); Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (the language of section 10(b) implies a negligence standard
absent definite congressional intent to the contrary).
The Hochfelder opinion stated that the 1934 Securities Exchange Act was "bereft of
explicit explanation of Congress' intent." 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
28. 605 F.2d 612, 621-23 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No.
79-66) (the Aaron court reasoned that the policy considerations surrounding equitable
actions should be crucial). The dichotomy between law and equity will be examined
more fully in the text accompanying notes 53-81 infra.
29. 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978).
30. Id. at 1026-27.
31. Compare SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'g,
429 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D. Va. 1977) (which had held that scienter was required) and
SEC v. Southwest Coal & Energy Co., 439 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. La. 1977) (not requiring a showing of scienter for a section 17(a) action) with SEC v. Cenco Inc., 436 F.
Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill.
1977) (scienter required).
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properly issued against Peter Aaron. First, the court reasoned that
the decision of the district court would not be set aside absent a clear
abuse of discretion. Secondly, the appellate court relied on its previous
holding that a permanent injunction was proper if the court determined that there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be
repeated. 32 The Aaron court further noted that since the district court
33
found that Peter Aaron had acted with scienter, the need for a
34
permanent injunction was more compelling.
ANALYSIS

A.

Statutory Analysis

The analysis in Hochfelder began with the language of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5. A majority of the Justices concluded that the
words "manipulative and deceptive" found in section 10(b) were clearly terms of art in the securities field requiring willful or intentional
conduct." Although the Hochfelder Court was clearly convinced that
the language of section 10(b) connoted intentional misconduct, and
that the plain meaning of a statute is controlling, the Court never36
theless proceeded to consider the legislative history of section 10(b).
Although explicit congressional statements on the question could not
be found, the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion indicated
by textual statutory analysis, that scienter was a required element in
private actions under section 10(b)." Thus the Supreme Court by its
32. SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC
v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972).
33. SEC v. Aaron, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,043 at 91,685 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
34. 605 F.2d 612, 623 n.16 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No.
79-66). The Aaron court noted that its decision allowing liability for negligence rather
than scienter, under sections 17(a), 10(b), and rule l0b-5, might not be conclusive.
Quoting from Judge Friendly's opinion in SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc.,
574 F.2d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 1978), the court stated "the final word will not rest with us."
Perhaps the Aaron court was alluding to a future Supreme Court decision on the issue
which Hochfelder had avoided.
35. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). But see note 27 supra.
However, the term "device," is also found in section 10(b) and has been viewed as requiring something less than actual intent. Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209
U.S. 56, 71 (1908) (not a § 10(b) application).
36. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-06 (1976).
37. Id. at 206. The Supreme Court supported its conclusion by stating that Congress had not specifically stated that scienter should not be required. Id. at 204. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that, in hearings before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934), section 10(b) was
described as a "catch all" clause to prevent manipulative devices, and that this conclusively indicated a non-negligence standard. Id. at 203-04. While this view may have
merit, the lack of evidence of a specific congressional intent is crucial. For instance,
the "catch all" statement well might suggest coverage of all forms of conduct, including intentional misconduct, recklessness, and negligence.
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analysis clearly concluded that scienter was a required element in a
proper cause of action for damages by a private party under section
10(b).18 However, the Hochfelder Court specifically refused to consider the question whether scienter is a necessary element in an action
by the SEC for injunctive relief under section 10(b).19
If the Hochfelder statutory analysis is conclusive then the SEC
should be bound to the same standard under section 10(b) as would be
a private party."' But other courts have not found the language of section 10(b) to be as clear as the Hochfelder Court viewed it regarding
the scienter requirement." The Supreme Court in Addison v. Holly
Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 2 stated that Congress' words, if susceptible
to one meaning as well as another, should not stifle a policy by a pedantic
or grudging process of construction."3 While the Hochfelder Court felt
certain that the language of section 10(b) clearly established the scienter
equipment, the Court failed to consider the impact of such an analysis.
The approach in Hochfelder, a private action for damages by a few
investors, could severely compromise the efforts of the SEC to provide
maximum protection to the investing public, if applied in actions
initiated by that agency."
The SEC as amicus curiae in Hochfelder, argued that the interdependent nature of the securities acts suggests that a negligence
standard is sufficient for a private action under section 10(b). 5 Congress, in some sections, had set forth the specific mental state required
for liability.4 6 But the Supreme Court noted that legal actions under
The Aaron court noted that it was not surprising that very little legislative history on
the subject was found by the Hochfelder Court because a judicially created private
right of action was being analyzed. 605 F.2d 612, 621 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No. 79-66).
38. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).
39. Id. at 193 n.12.

40. See note 11 supra.
41. See notes 26 & 27 supra. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718
(8th Cir. 1967); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
42. 322 U.S. 607 (1944) (dealing with a suit brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
43. Id. at 617.
44. SEC v. Shiell, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,190 at 92,386 (N.D. Fla. 1977).
45. Brief by SEC as amicus curiae at 23-33, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976) (noting that section 9 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1976),

specifically requires willful conduct; therefore, because section 10(b) does not spell out
the requirement, negligence should be sufficient).
46. Examples of explicit mental state requirements are: 1933 Securities Act §
11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976) (absolute liability for an issuer of securities for
misleading statements contained in the registration statement); 1933 Securities Act §
l l(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (1976) (due diligence negligence standard for experts who are responsible for misleading statement in the registration statement); 1934
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/12
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the provisions of the 1933 Act are subject to specific restrictions while
the 1934 Act provisions are not similarly governed.4 7 Thus the Supreme

Court was reluctant to apply a negligence scheme to section 10(b)
because that section is not subject to extensive procedural safeguards."8
The Hochfelder opinion concluded by suggesting that although
SEC rule lOb-5 might be read to include negligent conduct, such an interpretation would not be supportable. Rule lOb-5 was derived and

promulgated under the authority of section 10(b), and that section requires a scienter standard., 9
Although it has a "certain technical consistency about it," 0 the
Hochfelder statutory analysis should be viewed as conclusive. It is
drawn from incomplete views of congressional intent."1 In addition,
although the plain meaning analysis employed by the Hochfelder
Court is viable, policy considerations should not be completely

shunted aside in favor of mere words."
B.

The SEC: Origins and Function

Although the Hochfelder opinion is virtually devoid of policy
discussion, such considerations were voiced by the SEC as amicus
curiae. 3 Simply stated, to require the SEC to prove scienter rather
than negligence will make it increasingly difficult for the SEC to per-

form its function under the securities laws. 4
Indeed, the histories of the securities acts indicate that Congress intended to eliminate the abuses which contributed to the 1929 stock
market crash." The aims of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were to assure that
Securities Exchange Act § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976) (liability for intentional conduct concerning misleading documents).
47. The procedural restrictions include section 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976)
and section 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976), both provisions requiring plaintiff to post
bond. Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976), is subject to a one year statute of limitations.
48. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211-12 (1976).
49. Id. at 214. In further support, the Court noted that rule l0b-5 was drawn up
by the SEC in 1942 in order to prevent intentional misconduct. Id. It should be noted
that the language of rule lOb-5 is very similar to the language used in section 17(a). See
note 21 supra for the comparison.
50. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 216 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 621 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979)
(No. 79-66).
52. Scienter After Hochfelder, supra note 11, at 425-35.
53. Brief by SEC as amicus curiae at 11-12, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976). The SEC cited to SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180 (1963), and argued that the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
was to provide investors with the broadest possibile protection against false and deceptive practices.
54. SEC v. Shiell, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,190 at 92,386 (N.D. Fla. 1977).
55. SEC
v. Capital Gains
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1980Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
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full disclosure to prospective investors and purchasers would be made
in order to provide for investor protection and, ultimately, to restore
public confidence in the securities industry.5 6 In order to effectuate
these goals, the foremost aim of Congress was to avoid a strict, unworkable regulatory scheme which would impede their achievement."
The SEC was created by the 1934 Securities Exchange Act with these
objectives clearly in focus.5 8
It is difficult to see, given the context in which the SEC was
created, why that enforcement agency should be saddled with the difficult burden of proving scienter. A negligence standard would enable
the SEC to function more flexibly within the framework of the
securities laws and judicial review in order to provide, as Congress intended, maximum protection to the investing public. 9
Because the SEC function encompasses the initiation of equitable
actions, an analysis of the peculiarities of injunctive relief is in order.
The Supreme Court in Hecht v. Bowles 6" stated:
[t]he essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor
to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular
case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of
mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as
well as between competing private claims. 6 '
At common law, a court in equity did not need proof that an actor
knew that a representation made was false. 62 This was because it was
thought that equitable remedies subjected a defendant to less harm
56. SEC Civil Actions, supra note 1, at 332-34. The author noted that the 1933
Securities Act sought to provide investors, through a registration process, with information necessary to make informed judgments as to new securities publically offered
and to prohibit fraudulent and deceptive practices in the sale of securities. The 1934
Securities Exchange Act created the SEC to oversee the securities laws. The 1934 Act
also sought to extend the full disclosure doctrine to securities sold on national exchanges. Id. at 329-30.
57. Id. at 335.
58. 605 F.2d 612, 622 n.14 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. (1979) (No.
79-66). For an excellent discussion of the remedial purposes of the securities acts, see
generally 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1-158 (2d ed. 1961); 4 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATIONS 2201-94 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); SEC CivilActions, supranote 1,
at 329-35. See also SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) (the purpose of
the securities laws is to safeguard the public interest).
59. SEC Civil Actions, supra note 1, at 335.
60. 321 U.S. 321 (1944) (dealing with the injunctive powers of the Administrator
of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942).
61. Id. at 329.
62. The landmark English case of Redgrave v. Hurd, 20 C.D. 1 (1880), held that
in equity the state of the actor's mind was irrelevant with respect to the representation
made. Id. at 12-13.
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than remedies at law. 63 Thus, a two-tier system evolved for misrepresentation: at equity, scienter was not required; at law, scienter was
required 64
When Congress enacted the securities laws, it provided the SEC
with the flexible equity tools found in sections 20(b) and 21(d). 6' As a
consequence of the ease and speed with which an injunction can be obtained, 6 6 the SEC uses the section 10(b) and 21(d) provisions frequently
and successfully.67 When dealing with an SEC enforcement action, the
courts have looked beyond section 10(b) to section 21(d) in order to
determine the mental state required for liability. 68 While such an approach seems to be backward, because a violation of section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 invokes the 21(d) remedy, it nevertheless signifies the
substantial hold equity has on the proceeding. 9
In analyzing section 21(d) courts have looked at the language and
legislative history of the provision. 70 The conclusion reached by those
courts, and some legal scholars, is that Congress intended to follow the
equity roots of the law. Thus, scienter should not be a requirement.7 '
63. Scienter After Hochfelder, supra note 11, at 439-45.
64. Id. at 439. An application of this two-tier scheme in the securities field is
found in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). See text
accompanying notes 89-93 infra.
65. See note 13 supra for the texts of these provisions. For a discussion of the
creation of the SEC under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, see generally 1 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATIONS

129-58 (2d ed. 1961). For a discussion of the equity tools

available to the SEC, see generally Note, Equitable Remedies In SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 (1975).
66. Note, The Statutory Injunction As An Enforcement Weapon of Federal
Agencies, 57 YALE L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1948).
67. SEC Civil Actions, supra note 1, at 328. The SEC has a 92% success rate
when bringing suits for injunctive relief.
68. 605 F.2d 612, 621-22 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No.
79-66). Accord, SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Pearson, 426
F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970).
69. Note, Scienter's Scope and Application in Rule lOb-5 Actions: An Analysis in
Light of Hochfelder, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925, 943 (1977); Scienter After
Hochfelder, supra note 11, at 439-45. The argument is therefore made that the
Hochfelder scienter requirement for section 10(b) does not apply when the SEC brings
suit for injunctive relief.
70. 605 F.2d 612, 621-23 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No.
79-66).
71. The wording of section 21(d), "any person is engaged or is about to engage in
acts or practices," indicates that willful conduct is not a requisite element. Id. at 622
n.14. See note 13 supra for the text of section 21(d). The Aaron court undertook an
analysis of the legislative history of section 21(d) and concluded that scienter is not required. Id. at 622 (citing to S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975), concerning
the 1975 amendments to section 21(d)). Other courts have also recognized that the
equity two-tier scheme has survived in present day securities regulation. See, e.g., SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). But see SEC v. Blatt, 583
F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (scienter required under section 21(d)); SEC v. Coffey, 493
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While some commentators have taken offense at this view, 7" it has
been repeatedly held that an injunction under section 21(d) merely requires a showing of a reasonable likelihood that a wrong will be
repeated."3 Under this view, if the scienter element is found, it is
relegated to consideration as but one of several factors which can be
used to show the likelihood of a repetition of the wrong. 4
The Hochfelder Court dealt with a private cause of action and,
therefore did not consider the equity considerations associated with an
SEC enforcement action.7" Furthermore, the Hochfelder analysis appears to disregard all policy considerations surrounding securities
regulation. 6 It would seem clear that Hochfelder should not apply to
SEC injunctive actions because the Court dealt with neither equity nor
the crucial policy considerations associated with securities regulation. 7
Because the firm equity basis of section 21(d) should preclude the
burden Hochfelder might have placed on SEC actions,7 8 and because
securities law policy considerations should be considered in an SEC acF.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975) (willful or reckless
behavior required for an SEC enforcement action).
72. The offended commentators deal with the problem by looking at the severity
of an injunction. Scienter A Reappraisal,supra note 5 (authors reason that an injunction is a powerful weapon and should be linked to a higher culpability standard); SEC
Civil Actions, supra note 1 (author reasons that an injunction is not such a mild
remedy when one considers the possibility of criminal or civil contempt charges for a
violation of the injunction and, therefore, some purposeful activity should be required).
73. 605 F.2d 612, 623 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No.
79-66). Accord, SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
74. 605 F.2d 612, 624 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No.
79-66). (scienter found; underscores the need for an injunction) See note 100 infra.
Comment, Scienter and SEC Injunctive Suits, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1018 (1977), cites
several factors a court should consider when determining whether an injunction is
proper: degree of scienter found; defendant's assurances that he will adhere to the law;
defendant's expressions of innocence; extent of past violations and a possible pattern
of such violations; personal gain for the defendant; and defendant's motivation for a
repeat of such conduct.
75. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
76. Id. at 201-06. The Hochfelder opinion disregarded policy by considering the
language of the statute as controlling. See Scienter Under Rule JOb-5, supra note 11, at
883.
77. SEC v. Shiell, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,190 (N.D. Fla. 1977), links the
securities policy and equity considerations together by stating:
[t]he purpose of an action for injunctive relief is to protect the public against injurious conduct, not to punish defendant's state of mind. To impose on the SEC
the burden of providing deliberate dishonesty in an enforcement action could
seriously hamper its ability to police securities transactions and thereby diminish
the protection previously afforded the public.
Id. at 92,386. But see SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978).
78. Note, Scienter's Scope and Application in Rule lOb-5 Actions: An Analysis in
Light of Hochfelder, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925, 941-42 (1977).
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tion for injunctive relief, 9 an equity analysis under section 21(d)
should circumvent Hochfelder.8 0 While the equity and policy analyses
presented might appear to be conclusive, it is certainly debatable
whether the Supreme Court will, in the future, disregard the result of
the Hochfelder analysis of section 10(b) and more fully consider the
implications of section 21(d). 8 '
C.

The Term "Scienter"

Much of the problem in the area of antifraud securities litigation
centers on the uncertain and ill-defined terms used: scienter,
recklessness, and negligence. 82 At common law, in the area of misrepresentation, 8 3 scienter is defined as the intent to deceive, mislead, or
convey a false impression. 4 Intent is found when a representation is
made without any belief as to its truth or with a reckless disregard of
the truth. 8" This standard differs from a negligence standard in which a
representation can be made with an honest belief in its truth, but
because of a lack of reasonable care in ascertaining the facts or in the
manner of expression, the speaker might nonetheless be considered at
fault. 6 At common law, proof of actual intent is needed in an action
79.
80.

Scienter Under Rule lOb-5, supra note 11, at 901.
But see note 72 supra.

81. Ironically, a possible prediction of future Supreme Court action came out of
the Second Circuit in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd on other grounds, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). The case dealt with a phone
conversation and alleged deceptions during that conversation. The district court concluded that Hochfelder applied to SEC actions as well. In doing so, the court
disregarded the line of Second Circuit negligence holdings for SEC actions and, on the
contrary, proceeded under the Second Circuit's line of private action cases requiring

scienter. The court read Hochfelder to include reckless behavior.
Attorneys for Peter Aaron argued that the Bausch & Lomb decision may have implicitly changed the law in the Second Circuit. Brief for Appellant at 40, SEC v.
Aaron, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No. 79-66).
While Aaron is clearly distinguishable from Bausch & Lomb, it is nevertheless significant with respect to the Second Circuit's negligence stand that such a conflict should
occur within the circuit.
82. See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1432 (2d ed. 1961); Bucklo, Scienter
and Rule lOb-5, 67 Nw. L. REV. 562, 564-75 (1972).

83. An action for intentional misrepresentation required: an intent that a
representation be made; that the representation be directed to a particular person or
class of persons; that the representation convey a certain meaning; and that the
representation be believed and acted upon in a certain way. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF

TORTS § 107, at 700 (4th ed. 1971). For the purposes of this note, misrepresentation encompasses the old action of deceit when an intent to mislead has been established. Id. §
105, at
84.
85.
86.

684-86.
Id. § 107, at 700.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 704.
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for intentional misrepresentation, and negligence alone is not sufficient
for liability. 87 The proof difficulties for intentional misrepresentation
are more substantial than for negligence because the actor's subjective
88
state of mind is crucial to a finding of intent.
In the area of securities regulation, however, the general consensus
among commentators89 and the courts"0 is that the strict common law
scienter requirement for an action in misrepresentation, if applied to
an action under the securities laws, would act to deter achievement of
the remedial purposes of the securities laws. The Supreme Court led
the way in the gradual erosion of the common law in SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,9 ' by holding that in an action for
equitable relief, the SEC need not show all the technical elements of
common law fraud.9 " The Capital Gains Court dealt with the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and reasoned that requiring the SEC to
prove scienter or the actual intent to9 3 deceive would undermine the
remedial effects of that securities act.
The Hochfelder Court concluded that under section 10(b) and rule
87. Id. at 701. The landmark English case of Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337
(1889), was responsible for this two-tier view of misrepresentation by holding that in
an action for deceit scienter was a necessary element.
88. In K. BIALKIN, THE 10(b) SERIES OF RULES 9 (1975), the author further states
that the common law deceit action has little utility in securities transactions.
89. In 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1766 (2d ed. 1961), Loss recognizes a
need for some watered down scienter requirement under rule l0b-5 and believes that
the out-moded common law view should not control. In K. BIALKIN, THE 10(b) SERIES
OF RULES 15 (1975), Bialkin states that scienter has lost its meaning and, therefore,
negligence should suffice when the SEC brings suit for injunctive relief.
In opposition, the authors of Scienter A Reappraisal, supra note 5, believe that
Hochfelder requires a showing of actual intent when the SEC brings suit. It should be
noted that the authors, Berner and Franklin, represented Ernst & Ernst in Hochfelder.
90. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (common law elements of
fraud should be modified in order to accomplish the congressional purposes); Lanza v.
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (scienter liberally defined as
willful, deliberate or reckless disregard of the truth that is merely equivalent to actual
knowledge).
91. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
92. Id. at 192-94. Accord, Affiliated UTE Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128
(1972).
93. 375 U.S. at 195. The reasoning used in Capital Gains has been applied to section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of 1934 Act by lower federal courts. See,
e.g., SEC v. World Radio Missions, Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) J 95,751 (1st Cir.
1976); SEC v. Spectum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d
1339 (10th Cir. 1970).
But cf. Scienter A Reappraisal, supra note 5 (authors state that Capital Gains
should not extend to section 10(b) since the reasoning employed was directed at the Investors Advisers Act of 1940); Scienter Under Rule lob-5, supra note 11 (author states
that the Capital Gains decision did not adequately spell out what the required state of
mind is, thus decreasing the value of the opinion as support for the negligence position).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/12
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lOb-5, in a private cause of action, scienter or the intent to deceive,
manipulate or defraud must be shown.9 4 Thus, by the words used in
Hochfelder, it would appear that a return to the common law had been
effectuated. 95 However, the Hochfelder scienter definition has been
read by courts and commentators to include lesser degrees of culpability, than required at common law, for a section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
private cause of action. 96 If this course towards a lesser standard of
culpability is followed then the harsh effects of Hochfelder in this area
of the law may be mitigated. 97
The crucial difference, however, between an SEC and a private action still stands. SEC enforcement actions are brought to afford the investing public maximum protection while private actions for damages
primarily provide monetary relief to individual investors.98 The Aaron
94. 425 U.S. at 193.
95. While the Hochfelder decision makes few references to Capital Gains, the
opinion cites to Capital Gains in reference to the Supreme Court's refusal to consider
the scienter requirement in a SEC enforcement action. Id. at 194 n.12. Perhaps the
Hochfelder Court was signaling that a future decision involving the SEC would rely on
CapitalGains as precedent. If this is the case, the SEC would probably not be required
to show scienter for a section 10(b) action. Furthermore, the Hochfelder opinion noted
that in certain areas of the law the term scienter encompassed reckless behavior. The
Court, however, refused to rule on the issue. Id. at 194 n.12.
96. The cases that have taken this expanded view of the Hochfelder scienter
standard include, SEC v. Cenco Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (scienter under
Hochfelder includes recklessness or a highly unreasonable omission involving not
merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from ordinary
care), and SEC v. Wills, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,102 (D.D.C. 1977) (scienter
liberally construed to include reckless behavior). The positions taken by these courts
qualify the potential harsh effect Hochfelder might have had on SEC enforcement actions. This, however, does not solve the problem. See notes 97-100 infra.
Various commentators have also spoken on the issue. In Bucklo, Scienter and Rule
lob-5, 67 Nw. L. REV. 562 (1972), the author stated that scienter is an illdefined and
overused term that should be construed to mean actual or constructive knowledge. Id.
at 571. Furthermore, while the author notes that a negligence standard may be harmful
to the defendant, crucial policy considerations for investor protection suggest a
negligence scheme for SEC enforcement actions. Id. at 594. In Bucklo, The Supreme
Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule lOb-5: Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29
STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977), the same author concluded that the Hochfelder opinion
seemed to include acts of recklessness under its definition of scienter. Id. at 219-20. See
also Scienter Under Rule lob-5, supra note 11, at 932 (scienter standard should not be
rigid, but should be limited to the particular circumstances); Comment, Rule lob-5
Liability after Hochfelder: Abandoning the Concept of Aiding and Abetting, 45 U.
Cm. L. REV. 218 (1977) (given the difficulties in determining the actual state of mind,
lesser degrees of culpability should be read into the Hochfelder decision).
97. An expansion of the scienter term to include lesser degrees of culpability will
certainly help to mitigate the harsh effects that Hochfelder has on private plaintiffs in
actions brought under section 10(b). But even a recklessness standard is viewed as too
restrictive when the SEC brings suit. See note 99 infra.
98. 605 F.2d 612, 621 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No.
79-66).
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case, in particular, and the case law of the Second Circuit, generally,
do not seem amenable to a higher standard for culpability. 9 Clearly,
while scienter in some form or degree may be shown in the Second Circuit to establish liability in SEC injunctive actions, negligence is the
controlling standard in that it is sufficient. '
Therefore, while Hochfelder can be read to include lesser degrees
of culpability, and many commentators reason that scienter also at
least includes reckless behavior, this is still quite distant from the
negligence standard set forth in Aaron.
CONCLUSION

Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Hochfelder, stated: "[i]t seems to
me, however, that an investor can be victimized just as much by
negligent conduct as by positive deception, and that it is not logical to
drive a wedge between the two, saying that Congress clearly intended
the one but certainly not the other."" ° ' While Justice Blackmun was
arguing for a negligence standard for private parties, his reasoning
centered on the need to provide maximum protection to the public,
regardless of the identity of the party bringing suit. The scienter standard as set forth in Hochfelder, Blackmun concluded, would thwart
needed relief for investors and would ultimately cause Congress to
directly deal with the dilemma.' 0 2
Therefore, the position taken by the Second Circuit, recently affirmed in SEC v. Aaron,10 3 should not falter in light of Hochfelder"4
and other Supreme Court decisions geared to limiting private access to
the securities laws. The SEC is not a private party and the standards
used to evaluate and control it need not be identical to those applicable
to private parties. The inconclusive Hochfelder analysis must,
therefore, not override or impede the important function of the SEC in
99.

Id. at 622-24 (negligence alone is sufficient when the SEC brings suit under

sections 10(b) and 21(d)). Accord, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). The reader is reminded that the Second
Circuit is considered a leader in the area of securities law. See note 8 supra.
100. 605 F.2d 612, 623-24 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No.
79-66 (scienter found relevant in determining only whether an injunction is appropriate). Accord, SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp. 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); SEC v. Spectum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir.
1973); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d
559 (2d Cir. 1977). But see, SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd on othergrounds, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). See note 81 supra.
101. 425 U.S. at 216 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 218.
103. 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (1979) (No. 79-66).
104. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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securities regulation. The courts should not burden the SEC with a
higher culpability standard under section 10(b).
The direction of the law to include reckless behavior under the
Hochfelder scienter requirement does not appear satisfactory. Such a
standard would still burden the SEC by requiring it to show and prove
subjective elements related to the defendant's state of mind. A
negligence standard would obviate this requirement, and set a
minimum culpability level with which the SEC could better further the
purposes and policies of the securities laws.
The need for adequate securities regulation today has not
diminished since the securities laws were enacted and the role of the SEC
should, therefore, not be made more burdensome by requiring the SEC
to prove scienter in an action for injunctive relief. The SEC must be
allowed to function flexibly in order to protect the public and the
securities industry. The two-tier equity scheme which does not require a
showing of scienter in a common law action for misrepresentation, and
the policy considerations underlying the securities laws, should be the
bulwarks against the imposition of a scienter requirement in SEC enforcement actions.
Scott EdwardMiller
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